Recently, credit ratings have been enhancing the influence on issuers as well as the national economy. This paper explains the historical development and several current features of the Japanese bond market, and discusses why credit ratings gained a significant role in the 1990s. We also present empirical research on credit ratings in the Japanese bond market, and discuss how foreign raters tend to assign lower credit ratings than Japanese ones, but that the relative ratings among raters end up being similar. Finally, we clarify the issues that remained to be solved before credit rating companies can be considered truly reliable.
I. Introduction
Many observers (e.g., Allen and Gale 2000) regard Japan and Germany as bank-centered economies and the United States and United Kingdom as market-centered economics. For example, Figure 1 shows that German firms obtained only 1 % of funds by issuing bonds and Japanese firms obtained 8% of funds by issuing bonds during the 1997-2001 period. Thus, the bond markets in Japan and Germany have historically played only a marginal role in corporate financing.
Figure 1 About Here
However, we would like to point out that the Japanese securities market has become important in recent years. Figure 2 focuses on recent developments. During the late 1980s, which was called "the bubble period," "securities excluding stocks" increased because of the increase in the issuance of equity-related bonds, such as convertible bonds and warrant bonds. Furthermore, the financial deregulation and reforms in the late 1990s (e.g., the Japanese Financial Big Bang) have fostered the securities markets, and the share of securities in private firms liabilities has reached around 8%
1 . Thus, although the absolute level is not yet high if compared with the U.S. figure, it is clear that the bonds market has steadily increased its importance in Japanese corporate financing.
1 Current Flow of Funds statistics (93SNA Base) are available since 1979. According to the old Flow of Funds statistics (68SNA base), total liabilities of Japanese non-financial corporations at the end of the first quarter of 1965 were 48.3 trillion yen, while "securities excluding stocks" and loans of Japanese non-financial corporations were 1.7 trillion yen and 24.7 trillion yen, respectively. Therefore, securities excluding stocks accounted for only 3.5% of total liabilities.
Their share had decreased to 2.4% at the end of the first quarter of 1974.
raters, we provide an explanation of the important features of Japanese credit raters in Section IV.
In Section V, we present findings from empirical research we conducted on credit ratings in the Japanese bond market. We found that foreign raters tended to assign lower credit ratings than Japanese ones, but that the relative ratings among raters became similar. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. Brief History of the Spread of Credit Ratings in Japan
Until the Great Depression in the 1930s, most debentures in the Japanese bond market were issued with no collaterals except foreign bonds issued by Japanese corporations. During this period, conflicts between investors and defaulted issuers were incessant, and financial institutions that undertook defaulted bonds were blamed for being remiss. Therefore, the default disposal procedure in which undertakers ultimately purchased defaulted bonds in place of issuers became a normal practice before the 1930s.
However, the sharp increase of defaults after 1930 made it difficult for undertakers to take over debts. As a result, the commercial law was revised in 1938, and the so-called Rule of Compulsory
Collateral was established. The Rule required corporations to use their lands or buildings as collaterals whenever they issued bonds.
After World War II, the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) strengthened investor protection through the establishment of the Qualification Standard for Bond Issuing. This Standard excluded unsuitable issuers from the bond market. To begin with, bond-issuing-suitable corporations were screened through several financial indicators such as the amount of capital stock, net assets and capital ratio. Next, selected qualified corporations were rated into four ranks (i.e., AA, A, BB and B), and the amounts that each company were allowed to issue were dependent on its rank. This ranking system is different from the American type of credit rating system. Japanese ranking was used to select who could issue bonds, while the American type of rating was used to estimate the default risks of bonds.
Bond issuing was not attractive for corporations that had high creditworthiness, because all issuers were charged at almost the same interest rates and could not issue what they wanted regardless of their creditworthiness. Because of this, in the 1970s many Japanese corporations began to issue foreign bonds in the New York, London, and Swiss markets. This trend forced the MOF and the BOJ to consider how to avert the hollowing of the domestic market.
In October 1977, the Securities and Exchange Council, which was an advisory committee of the MOF, published "A Report on What the Japanese Bond Market Should Be", in which the Council advanced that the MOF should liberalize corporate bonds being issued in Japan. Additionally, the Council suggested the need to introduce an American type of rating system into Japan, where outsider institutions without interests for issuers could estimate the abilities of bond issuers to redeem those bonds and inform investors of these results. Furthermore, in the report, the Council proposed the approval of debentures with no collaterals and the establishment of investors' self-responsibilities principle. However, it took a substantial amount of time for the MOF to implement these proposals for bond market reform.
In January 1984, the MOF and financial institutions together organized the Workshop of Debenture Issues, and the Workshop began discussing what roles the American type of raters had played. The Workshop then published their assessment in the report of the US-Japan Dollar-Yen Committee. They made three crucial points in their assessment: (1) that plural rating agencies should be established, (2) the independence of these agencies should be assured, and (3) both issuers and investors should be required to pay rating charges.
It was in 1985 that credit rating agencies as independent organizations began to operate in Japan. During this year, Moody's and S&P opened their offices in Tokyo, and two domestic raters, the Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR) and Nippon Investors Service (NIS), were established. In addition, the Japan Bonds Research Institute (JBRI) was incorporated in the same year. In July However, in the first decade of the raters' history in Japan, the Qualification Standard for bond issuing was still in effect. In February 1987, the MOF added a new rating qualification (i.e., "above AA" or "above A with more than 55 billion yen of net assets") to the traditional numerical standards (e.g., 300 billion in net assets and more than 30% of the equity ratio). A corporation satisfying either the new or traditional standards was admitted to issue bonds. However in June 1990, the numerical standards were abolished, and the rating standard was eased from "above BBB with collaterals" or "above A without collaterals," to "BB with collateral" or "BBB without collaterals" in April 1993. Finally, the Qualification Standard was completely abolished in January 1996. That is, all firms were allowed to issue bonds if the bonds could be sold, and the interest rates were made dependent on the issuers' financial conditions (Yamasawa 2003) .
The abolition of requirements for issuing bonds itself caused several transformations in the Japanese bond markets. Kurosawa (1999) pointed out the following two transformations. First, a firm even in the worst financial situation in principle could issue bonds by paying high interest rates reflecting the risks. Therefore, investors needed to obtain information about the size of risks of issuers. However, investors and analysts found it difficult to obtain relevant information for investment in securities because corporate disclosure was not sufficient at the time when the bond market deregulation was carried out.
Another transformation was that Japanese corporations were now able to issue debentures without obtaining credit ratings. Previously the issuers had been obliged to obtain ratings from one of the Designated Rating Agencies in the case of straight bonds, and from two or more Designated Rating Agencies in the case of CBs. Abolition of this obligation encouraged competition among rating agencies in the markets. As a result, in April 1998, JBRI merged with NIS and restarted as R&I. In addition, the abolition also set off full-scale activities of Moody's and S&P in Japan.
After the overall abolition of the Qualification Standard, the amount of issuing bonds, particularly by high rated corporations, increased because corporations were now able to finance at low costs suitable to their creditworthiness. Figure 3 shows the recent development of straight bond markets in Japan. It is apparent that the amount issued sharply increased in the 1990s. R&I (1998) stated "the expansion of the corporate bond market has compensated for the depression of the indirect financial system in Japan to some extent"(p.59). In the late 1990s, large-scale bankruptcies of city bank, securities companies, life and non-life insurance companies, construction and major distribution companies occurred in quick succession. 
III-2. Downgrading of Japanese Government Bonds
Credit ratings on Japanese government bonds (JGBs) are important issues for Japan, because the total debt held by the Japanese government amounted to 751 trillion yen as of March 2005. If 2 However, a careful investigation finds that fundamental changes had already realized before the crisis. First, yields in Japanese bank debentures, which used to be the same among all banks, started to depend on issuing banks. Second, the number of bankruptcies steadily increased. Third, in September 1997, a main bank of Yaohan Japan rejected to take up Yaohan's CBs after its bankruptcy. It was the first default that occurred in Japanese publicly-issued domestic bond market since the end of World War II.
the interest rates of JGBs increase by 1% due to the downgrading of credit ratings, the government will have to pay an additional 7.5 trillion yen, which is one-sixth of the annual tax revenue of the government.
In April 1998, Moody's changed the yen-denominated JGBs ratings from Aaa stable to Aaa negative. Moody's simply explained that uncertainty had increased as to whether it would be possible for the Government to achieve its central aims, economic growth and fiscal improvement.
In June 1998, Moody's released a detailed report analyzing the Japanese economy. This report However, the MOF was not satisfied with the decision by Moody's and claimed that "considering the strong fundamentals of the Japanese economy, the current ratings of JGBs are already too low and any further downgrading is unwarranted. Your explanations regarding rating decisions are mostly subjective in nature and lack objective criteria, which invite questions about the reliability of rating itself" 3 .
Unlike with private corporations, it is difficult for sovereign ratings to be statistically confirmed through default experiences. Kurosawa (1999) indicated that compared with the credit ratings of private firms, the correlation between the sovereign ratings given by Moody's and those by S&P were lower. In addition, in the case of the monetary crisis in Asia in 1997, raters changed the sovereign ratings of Asian countries four or five times within one year. Ferri et al. (1999) insisted that it was credit rating agencies that aggravated the Asian monetary crisis.
IV. Japanese Rating Agencies

IV-1. General Characteristics of Japanese Rating Agencies
As we mentioned above, in 1984 the Workshop of Debenture Issues pointed out that independent rating agencies were necessary and that both investors and issuers should pay rating costs. According to the "independence" criterion, credit rating agencies are required not to have any capital and creditor-debtor relations with financial institutions that have interests in bonds issuing or bond-related administrations. For example, if a securities company dealing with bond issuing was a major stockholder of a rating agency, that agency might be lenient in rating bond issuers who are clients of that securities company.
Despite the Workshop's proposal, the MOF decided in 1985 that credit rating agencies were required to be capitalized by financial intermediaries and securities firms because the experiences of bankers in terms of screening long-term-lending and of analysts in securities firms in terms of underwriting bonds were necessary in order to assign appropriate credit ratings to long-term bonds. The MOF maintained that conflict of interest problems were avoidable by setting a subscription limit per investor within 5% of the entire capital. Although the MOF's decision was understandable given the circumstances of the 1980s, the capital structure of Japanese rating agencies has not been improving since then. As a result, more than half of the stocks of JCR and more than 40% of R&I are still occupied with financial institutions, including banks, securities companies and insurance companies. As the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has not accepted the Japanese MOF's decision, JCR and R&I cannot sell their rating information in the United States.
The issue of "who pays rating costs" is also important, because a rating agency could rate so as to give the payer an advantage. If only investors were to pay the costs, the ratings could tend to be stricter. However if only issuers pay the costs, the rating could be prone to be favorable to the issuers, who wish to finance at lower interest rates. Accordingly, as in the U.S., the Workshop of Debenture Issues thought that both investors and issuers should pay the costs to make the ratings fair. However, at that time in Japan, several institutional investors insisted that they had disagreed about paying for rating information to rating agencies because firms that were in bad financial condition were not permitted to issue debentures, and because credit ratings at that time had no information value. Consequently, the MOF decided that only issuers would pay rating costs for the time being, and investors would be required to pay the costs after the necessary conditions had been arranged. Although more than twenty years have passed, the system still remains unchanged in 2005.
Additionally, it is notable that there are two large differences between Japanese agencies and U.S. agencies in terms of rating operation. First, agencies in the United States value disclosed information such as financial statements, while Japanese agencies tend to put a high value on non-public information acquired through private interactions with firms. It is generally true that the financial soundness of Japanese corporations presented through disclosed data such as ROE, the equity ratio and liquidity ratio is inferior to that of U.S. corporations. Therefore, the ratings of U.S. agencies that put a high value on financial statements necessarily tend to be stricter for Japanese firms. Japanese rating agencies consider "qualitative information" as well as financial statements. For example, they think that the cross-holdings of equities, main-banks relations, keiretsu affiliations, a convention of priority payments in debenture or the government's back-ups are not shown in the balance sheet but enhance the firm's creditworthiness. It is quite natural that the ratings of Japanese raters which consider these factors are higher than those of American raters 4 .
Second, Japanese agencies are slower to downgrade firms than U.S. agencies 5 . Foreign raters anticipate the outcome of the event and change ratings in advance, while Japanese raters keep ratings unchanged until the actual effect of the event emerges. When a situation is deteriorating, Japanese raters tend to be slow to downgrade. Therefore, Japanese raters assigned inevitably higher rates than U.S. raters during the burst of the bubble period.
In the following sections, because Moody's and S&P are well known to international readers, we would like to give a detailed explanation of Japanese credit rating agencies.
IV-2. Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR)
Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR) was established in April 1985 and capitalized by life and non-life insurance companies, trust banks, regional banks and long-term credit banks. In
November 1985, it began to publish "JCR Reports", and in the next year, it started pay-rating on yen-denominated foreign bonds.
At the end of FY 2003, the ratings of JCR covered the 64.4% (590 firms) of Japanese firms which had obtained credit ratings. Its covering rates were especially high in the financial business (69.8%), distribution industry (71.9%) and non-manufacturing industry (73.9%) 6 . JCR has more actively rated foreign firms than R&I. Therefore, it has promoted business tie-ups with foreign rating agencies such as the SCI in Korea (August 2000) and the DCR-VIS in Pakistan (January 2001).
JCR does not execute non-requested ratings as a rule. JCR is considered superior to U.S. rating agencies in that JCR publishes their reports in Japanese as well as in English, and its analysts firms, keiretsu affiliation negatively affected its rating for one U.S. agency and one Japanese agency. And for financial firms, both U.S. agencies assessed keiretsu affiliation positively, while Japanese agencies did not. have constructed better and more loyal relations with Japanese firms and institutional investors than U.S. agencies through closer contacts with them. Moreover, JCR examines and monitors Japanese firms more carefully and cooperatively than U.S. agencies, and tries to describe Japanese firms more comprehensively than foreign analysts (Fight 2003) .
However, this agency has several faults. In particular, we cannot disregard the fact that it is capitalized by about one-hundred financial institutions. Formerly JCR employed many analysts coming from these institutions, and it was reasonably wondered whether they could properly rate the institutions they had formerly been employed by. Of course JCR now employs many analysts who have no relation with the financial institutions, but this independence problem still remains.
In addition, JCR was criticized for its rating ability because it assigned BBB to Mycal Co., a major retailer in Japan, in October 2000, but it went bankrupt in September 2001.
IV-3. Rating & Investment Information (R&I)
Rating & In April 1998, R&I was established through the merger of JBRI and NIS 7 . Nihon Keizai Shinbun, Inc. and its subsidiaries hold fifty-six percent of the stocks of R&I, and various financial institutions hold the rest. Therefore, this agency has the same independence problem as JCR due to the structure of its stockholders.
At the end of October 2002, R&I rated 705 firms. It has also promoted business tie-ups with 7 See http://www.r-i.co.jp/eng/company/history.html .
foreign rating agencies such as Fitch Ratings and NICS (an investment information company in Korea). Furthermore, R&I has been urged to extend its rating services to academic institutions, local governments, and special public corporations.
IV-4. Mikuni & Co., Ltd.
Unlike JCR and R&I, Mikuni & Co., Ltd. is a rating agency without the designation of the MOF.
It was established in 1975, and began offering financial analyses. It began issuing credit ratings in 1983. In the beginning, its main business was supplying foreign investors with information about Japanese firms issuing bonds in foreign countries. Now Mikuni's credit ratings cover 1500
Japanese firms. 8 This number is far above those of other rating agencies in Japan.
The distinguishing characteristic of Mikuni is that it has no business tie-up with any outsiders, and is completely free from any direction from and regulation by the government. One of Mikuni's corporate philosophies is to keep itself independent from any companies, bond issuers, financial institutions, brokers and government authorities because such independence enables it to form and express its opinions freely and objectively 9 .
Other characteristics of Mikuni's credit ratings are as follows. In contrast to designated agencies (i.e., JCR and R&I), Mikuni earns rating charges only from investors, not from issuers, and utilizes only disclosed information. In addition, it doesn't use the sovereign ratings of foreign firms to estimate each debenture. In other words, in terms of the usage of sovereign information, Mikuni is not only different from Japanese rating agencies, but from U.S. agencies, and thus Mikuni does not change ratings easily when unexpected events such as natural disasters or acts of terrorism occur.
Mikuni & Co., Ltd. is also well known as the strictest rater of Japanese firms. For example, it was Mikuni that first assigned different ratings among long-term credit banks in Japan. At the end of October 2003, the ratio of investment grade to speculative grade was 1 to 2, which was far stricter than those of Moody's and S&P at the same point in time.
V. An Empirical Investigation of Japanese Credit Ratings
V-1. Overview of Straight Bond Market
As discussed in the Introduction, bond issuance is not a primary source of outside funds for average Japanese firms. It is apparent that small firms cannot issue bonds because of information problems and large fixed expenditures. However, owing to deregulation, it is notable that large firms have increased their dependency on bonds.
In addition to the increase in the volume of bond issuance, there has been an important change.
Namely, various kinds of firms now issue bonds. During the regulated period, the share of utilities companies in the bond issue market was very large. In the 1990s, as shown in Figure 4 , the importance of utility companies as bond issuers decreased because their demand for funds significantly decreased.
Along with these developments, credit ratings and rating agencies are playing an increasingly important role in Japanese financial systems. We will investigate the actual credit rating practices 
V-3. Results
V-3-1 Who gains a share in the rating market?
There were five qualified rating agencies in Japan before 1998 and four rating agencies after 1998, when JBRI and NIS were merged into R&I 11 .
Firms can issue bonds with obtaining credit ratings from one rater 12 . However in practice, firms often obtained credit ratings from two or more credit rating companies. Table 2 shows the distribution of multiple ratings regarding straight bond issuance.
In 1993, more than 60% of issuances were with single credit ratings. That ratio decreased to 40% in 1996. We should note that the figures in 2000 and in 1996 were not directly comparable, the same (i.e., around 55%). Thus, currently, approximately half of issuers obtain credit ratings from two or more raters. However, it is also notable that very few companies obtain credit ratings from all four raters. In other words, firms choose their raters. want to sell bonds both in international and domestic markets need to obtain credit ratings from both American and Japanese raters.
In 1993 and 1996, as there were five raters, there were 10 two-rater combinations 13 . In 2000 and 2004, there were six combinations. Table 4 shows the results for 1993 and 1996. The combination between JBRI and Moody's (MDY) was the most popular in 1993 and 1996, followed by the combination between NIS and Moody's. Table 5 To put it another way, a Japanese-American combination was popular before 2000, but a Japanese-Japanese combination became popular after 2000 (see Table 6 ). Thus, this is consistent with the argument that the roles of Japanese rating agencies become more and more important in the 2000s. There is a possibility that multiple ratings may be effective in mitigating information asymmetries. If so, a firm that suffers from larger asymmetric information problems will more likely obtain multiple ratings. However, multiple ratings may not make any difference, or make matters even worse because firms have to pay to obtain multiple ratings.
We investigated what factors encouraged issuers to obtain multiple ratings by using the 2004 data. More concretely, we tested whether the amount issued, maturity, and interest rates were related with the number of ratings. For example, when a firm issued larger amount of corporate bonds and increased the leverage ratio, information asymmetries became worse. Such an issuer has an incentive to obtain multiple ratings to reduce information asymmetries. Table 7 shows how the number of credit ratings is related to the amount issued, maturity and interest rate. First, when a firm issues bonds that are worth a high amount, the firm tends to obtain two or more ratings. Second, the average maturity for bonds with one credit rating is 7.29 years, while it is 8.17 years for bonds with three credit ratings. Although bonds with two credit ratings have a longer maturity period than those with three ratings, a firm that issues bonds with longer maturity tends to obtain more credit ratings. Finally, there is no apparent relationship between the number of raters and interest rates. As multiple ratings alleviate the information problems, interest rates obtained by using multiple ratings would be lower than those obtained without multiple ratings. However, if the firms that have large asymmetric information problems choose multiple ratings, then the interest rates of bonds with multiple ratings will tend to be high.
Therefore, these cross-interactions may make the relationship between the number of raters and interest rates ambiguous.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that credit ratings are used to mitigate information problems. Of course, it should be noted that our results are tentative, because the data we used here was only for 2004. In addition, we need to conduct a more formal test in which several factors are controlled to reach a definitive conclusion. Table 7 About Here V-3-4 How do credit raters assign different ratings?
As Shin and Moore (2003) pointed out, credit rating standards are different among raters. Here, we will first investigate how different the raters's standards are. Following Morgan (2002) , who assigned each credit rating a numerical number, such as AAA=1, AA+(or Aa1)=2 and AA(or Aa2)=3, we calculated the average ratings for each rater.
The results are shown in Table 8 . In 1993, the average S&P rating was 1.88. As this means that most companies had AAA or AA+ ratings from S&P, S&P rated only highly solvent companies.
The averages of Moody's and JCR were 5.19 and 6.13, however, suggesting that they rated companies having relatively lower creditworthiness, if the rating standards were the same among these raters. While the difference in the average ratings between rating companies was relatively Following the argument of Morgan (2002) , the convergence of credit ratings is a signal of an improvement in the information problems. Thus, due to the disclosure and accounting reforms enacted since the late 1990s, we can tentatively conclude that credit rating companies can evaluate the creditworthiness of issuers much more precisely than before. To consider the difference in criteria, we will focus on firms that obtained more than two credit ratings (which we call "overlapped firms" below). As explained above, there were ten combinations of raters for 1993 and 1996 and six combinations for 2000 and 2004. However, several combinations had no overlapped firms. For example, there were no firms that obtained credit ratings from both JCR and S&P in 1993.
First, we calculated the average credit ratings for overlapped firms regarding each combination of raters. The results are shown in Table 9 . For example, in terms of the combination between JBRI and NIS, there were 12 overlapped firms in 1993. We found that the average ratings of JBRI and NIS for these 12 firms were 2.00 and 1. In sum, Japanese raters assigned more favorable credit ratings than American raters. As the difference is about three notches, a firm with a credit rating of A+ from a Japanese rater will obtain a credit rating of BBB+ from American raters. The bond market reflects this difference.
For example, as shown in Figure 5 , interest rates of bonds with a BBB rating from S&P and Moody's are almost the same as those with an A from R&I and JCR. 
Figure 5 About Here
It could be argued that absolute differences among raters may not be important, because we can adjust for the differences. However, if a Japanese rater regards Firm A as more solvent than Firm B, and a U.S. rater regards Firm A as less solvent than Firm B, market participants will find it difficult to evaluate relative creditworthiness between these firms. If raters are similar in terms of evaluating relative creditworthiness among firms, the correlation coefficients of ratings should be high. Therefore, we calculated the correlation coefficients. In 2000, the correlation coefficients of JCR with the other raters became higher than before.
The lowest value was found in terms of the combination of S&P and Moody's. This suggests that there were strong disagreements about Japanese firms' creditworthiness between American raters.
In 2004, all correlation coefficients in 2004 except between JCR and Moody's were close to one.
In particular, the correlation coefficients between Japanese raters (i.e., JCR and R&I) and those between American raters (i.e., Moody's and S&P) were very high. That is, these results in Table   10 are consistent with the argument that corporate disclosure reforms in the late 1990s have brought more accurate ratings, but there are some differences in rating criteria between Japanese and American raters.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we pointed out the increasing role that credit ratings are playing in Japan.
However, there are a lot of problems with ratings that remain to be solved. One issue concerns
American raters in Japan. In Japan, American raters are strongly criticized because people suspect that Moody's and S&P assign inappropriately low ratings to Japanese issuers. The actual default rates in the Japanese market do not seem to support these low ratings. Annual data released by Moody's and S&P show that their ratings are closely related with actual default ratios, but this only means that their ratings of U.S. companies are closely related with actual default ratios, and does not mean that their ratings of Japanese companies are also closely related with actual default ratios.
Japanese managers are often unsatisfied with the reasons given for downgrading by American raters, because they feel that American raters do not understand business practices in Japan. For example, according to Fight (2003) , Moody's degraded the rating of Toyota Motor Corporation from AAA to Aa1 in 1998 on the grounds that competition in the global automobile market is intensifying, and Toyota's competitiveness has weakened due to its practice of giving workers lifetime employment. In refuting Moody's, Mr. Okuda, the CEO of Toyota Motor Co., argued that the lifetime employment system was not a burden for Toyota because it had adopted a flexible employment structure. Eventually, Moody's upgraded Toyota's rating from Aa1 to AAA in 2003.
Furthermore, Fight (2003) pointed out the fact that none of twenty-five Japanese corporations that Moody's assigned speculative grades to before 1998 had defaulted as of October 2003, while the probability that firms rated Ba by Moody's would default within five years was 11.4 per cent.
He pointed out that Moody's might have disregarded specific factors in the Japanese market (e.g., mainbank relations) which lower default rates 14 .
There are also deep-rooted complaints against "unrequested ratings" by U.S. agencies in the Japanese bond market. In terms of unrequested ratings, there is a slight difference between S&P and Moody's. S&P clearly distinguishes "requested" and "unrequested" ratings for investors because investors recognize that unrequested ratings rely on less information or less reliable information than requested ratings. In contrast, Moody's insists that they are able to maintain the same quality for unrequested ratings as requested ones, so Moody's doesn't disclose the distinction at all.
Although there is considerable evidence that American raters are not always right, there are also serious problems with Japanese raters. As mentioned in Section IV, except for Mikuni & Co., Japanese credit rating agencies are not independent from issuers and financial institutions.
Namely, JCR and R&I are still substantially capitalized by financial institutions. In addition, these Japanese raters earn rating charges only from issuers. In other words, investors are not the customers of these raters. In fact, except for Mikuni, Japanese raters tend to assign better ratings to Japanese issuers than American raters. It is necessary to investigate whether the capital structure and business practices of Japanese raters distort their rating decisions.
Finally, we should point out that Japanese investors may not fully understand the meaning of rating grades. The Japanese mass media often state that a rating below BB+ is considered an "inadequate to invest" grade, not a "speculative grade", and Japanese investors also accept this interpretation. Therefore, in the Japanese market, once a firm is rated below BB+, the firm can no longer obtain necessary funds. However, "a speculative grade" doesn't mean that people shouldn't purchase the firms' bonds, but just means that there are relatively high risks to purchasing the bonds and a high expected return. Therefore, Japanese investors need to be educated on how to use credit ratings properly.
Thus, although credit ratings play a very important role in Japan, much remains to be done before credit ratings can be considered reliable and before they can be properly used in Japan. 
